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NOTES
FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO ENHANCE COMPETITION IN
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A relative absence of public control in the securities industry
made possible the 1929 "crash" which in turn led to subsequent
legislation to provide increased investor protection.' Similarly, un-
settled market conditions in the late 1960's 2 stimulated attempts to
remodel the earlier legislation to solve problems which policymakers
have begun to appreciate in recent years, particularly problems sur-
rounding the role of competition in the securities industry. Already
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has acted on its
own initiative to promote competition by abolishing fixed-rate
dealer commissions.3 The 94th Congress recently enacted the Secur-
ities Acts Amendments of 19751 which, by modifying the role of the
SEC, can enhance competition in the securities industry while pro-
viding investor protection. The legislation promotes development of
a central market system which willintensify competition by inform-
ing potential buyers and sellers about all transactions and quota-
tions in a particular security.5
Congressional reformers further believed that to resolve issues
affecting competition, basic changes in the SEC's regulatory au-
thority were needed to permit Commission review of challenges to
actions by the bodies that provide self-regulation for the industry:
the exchanges and th6 National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). The Act permits the SEC to review actions concerning
discipline and denial of membership6 and to review and amend rules
enunciating policy decisions of the self-regulatory bodies, either
upon its own initiative or upon petition by an aggrieved party.7 By
1. See note 15 infra & accompanying text.
2. The financial and operational crises of the securities industry in the late 1960's are
described in detail in HousE SUncoM. oN COWmSERCE & FiNANCE, SECURMS INDUSTRY STUDY
RoPoRT, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-13 (1972).
3. See note 236 infra.
4. Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4,1975). The Act arose from and reflected the individual efforts
of each house of Congress. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975), on April 24, 1975. 121 CONG. REc. H3258 (daily edition). For a discussion of the
House bill as introduced, see notes 195-98 infra & accompanying text. The Senate passed S.
249, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), on April 17, 1975.121 CONG. REc. S6189 (daily edition). For
a discussion of the Senate bill as introduced, see notes 223-32 infra & accompanying text.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7 (June 4, 1975), adding § 11A to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
6. Id. § 16, amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
7. Id.
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such measures, this legislation offers the promise of providing the
enhanced competition desired in the securities industry.
Appreciation of the gradual recognition of the need for increased
competition in the securities industry is necessary for an under-
standing of the present reforms. Until recent years, securities indus-
try policymakers did not perceive the need to define the role of
competition among market-makers.8 Antitrust litigation concerning
securities exchanges, brokers, and dealers sparked perception of the
problem by challenging the anticompetitive effects of regulation.
Adjudicating those challenges, courts consistently held that compe-
tition does play a role in securities regulation and struck down regu-
latory action not in accord with antitrust policy; in the process,
courts have evolved standards for balancing antitrust and securities
regulation policies.' Concurrently, industry policymakers, respond-
ing to the antitrust challenges, have conducted in-depth studies"0 to
provide data upon which to premise regulation that maximizes com-
petition while furthering the investor protection intended by federal
securities legislation. Seeking those objectives, reformers turned
first to the existing federal securities legislation for its guidance
regarding competition; while the drafters of forty years past clearly
intended no absolute antitrust exemption, a more detailed assess-
ment has been difficult.
Tim RATIONALE OF SEcuRrms REGULATION
The Securities Exchange Act of 193411 was a response to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression. 2 Unlike its prede-
cessor, the Securities Act of 193313 which was designed to require full
disclosure to investors, the subsequent Act was intended to grant
8. According to the SEC definition, a "market maker" is a "dealer who, with respect to a
particular security, holds himself out (by entering indications of interest in purchasing and
selling in an interdealer quotations system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell for
his own account on a continuing basis otherwise than on a national securities exchange." 17
C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)(1) (1974).
9. For a discussion of judicial treatment of antitrust attacks upon the securities industry,
see notes 57-125 infra & accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the various studies conducted during the past several years, see
notes 126-232 infra & accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
12. The present purpose is not to expound upon the economic tragedy of 1929. For detailed
analysis of causes and effects of the 1929 crash, see J. GAsRArrm, THE GREAT CRAsH (3d ed.
1972); A. Romsco, THE PovErry oF ABuNDANc- (1965); G. SouLB, PnosrpmUT DEcADn (1947).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
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broad regulatory powers over the securities market to the newly
formed Securities and Exchange Commission."' One commentator
has stated: "As a few critics at the time recognized, the market
crash did not occur from greed alone or only because predatory
individuals exploited ignorant investors. The crash occurred, in
part, because institutions, including the Investment Bankers Asso-
ciation and the New York Stock Exchange, lacked the will, the
ability, and the administrative apparatus necessary to regulate
greedy and predatory individuals."' 5 The result was a two-pronged
attack by Congress upon the securities market: first, to correct
abuses which led to the 1929 crash; second, to provide the Govern-
ment with sufficient regulatory power to prevent future abuses not
then foreseen specifically.
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, in advance of
the 1934 Act, investigated stock exchange practices for more than
two years." From that extended investigation, certain practices of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were targeted as the princi-
pal concerns of the Securities Exchange Act. Among them were the
following: excessive use of credit resulting in speculation on small
margins; extensive manipulation of prices by pools, options and
short-swing trading; and the failure of listed corporations to provide
adequate information to investors." Particular provisions of either
the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
were intended to eliminate, partly or wholly, all of these abuses."
Congress realized, however, that merely attacking particular
abuses would be insufficient to prevent a recurrence of the 1929
crash. Both the Senate Banking and Currency Committee report"
and the presidentially commissioned Roper Report0 reflected the
14. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
15. M. PARISH, SEUcRTEmS REGULATON AND Ti NEW DEaL 39 (1970).
16. See REPoRr OF Tm SmATE Comm. ON BANKmG Arm CUaaNC ON STOCK EXCHANGE
PRAo'ncEs, S. RP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1455]. That investigation produced more than twenty volumes of testimony and exhibits.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt also recognized the great need for regulation of the securities
industr and directed the Secretary of Commerce, D. C. Roper, to form a committee to study
exchange practices. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
17. For a discussion of the pre-crash abuses of the securities market, see Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 214, 217 (1959); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MicH.
L. REv. 1025 (1934).
18. See notes 37-39 infra.
19. S. P. No. 1455, supra note 16, at 48-49.
20. COMM. ON STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO SEcRErARY OF
1975]
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opinion that self-regulation by the NYSE was an undependable
method of policing the securities market. Both reports indicated a
need to provide a pervasive system of regulation with discretionary
powers in an administrative agency.21 Establishment of a regulatory
system was the means chosen to accomplish the 1934 Act's second
goal, the prevention of unspecified future abuses. While expressly
confronting some of the abuses not corrected by the Securities Act,
the drafters of the later Act primarily were determined "[t]o pro-
vide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes.
22
Seeking the two goals of reform and regulation of the securities
market, the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act articulated par-
ticular objectives sought by their system of regulation. Protection
of the general public from the practices that led to the crash of 1929
was the primary aim of the Act.2" Legislators closest to the project
were unanimous in their desire to restore investor confidence in the
securities market.24 Two qualities deemed essential to the long-
range effectiveness of the regulatory system were a minimum of
specific regulatory provisions and a maximum of discretionary pow-
ers in a strong administrative agency; the consensus was that the
delicate and complex market required a flexible means of supervi-
sion that could react and experiment with a minimum of procedural
COMMERcE (Comm. Print 1934). See note 16 supra.
21. President Roosevelt also favored strict regulation of the securities market. In letters to
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the Chairman of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, he wrote: "I have been definitely
committed to definite regulation of exchanges which deal in securities and commodities ...
I am certain that the country as a whole will not be satisfied with legislation unless such
legislation has teeth in it." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
22. Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881.
23. Senator Duncan U. Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, echoed this desire when he introduced a proposed bill to regulate the securities
market: "The bill just introduced for the regulation of securities exchanges is one of the series
of steps taken and to be taken for the purpose of bringing safety to the general public in the
field of investment and finance." 78 CoNo. Rc. 2270 (1934).
24. See id. at 7697 (statement of Chairman Rayburn of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce); id. at 7925-26 (statement of Representative Chapman); id. at 7689-
90 (statement of Representative Sabath). All were members of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which conducted extensive hearings on proposed legisla-
tion for the regulation of the securities market.
[Vol. 16:621
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delay.2- Flexibility demanded the grant of broad powers to the ad-
ministrative agency and provided the reason for establishing the
new Securities and Exchange Commission, rather than continuing
the policy of the Securities Act whereby the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was the administrator.26 Dissatisfaction with self-regulation
therefore resulted in what Congress hoped would be a powerful
watchdog agency with great flexibility to perform its regulatory
function.
Legislative history clearly indicates the regulatory objectives of
the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act; equally important,
however, to determining the role contemplated for competition in
the securities industry by Congress is the intended application, if
any, of the antitrust statutes existing in 1934.2 The Securities Ex-
change Act provides no explicit exemption from antitrust laws, and
commentators have agreed that neither the history nor the general
scheme of the securities laws suggests that Congress intended any
general immunity.28 The district court in United States v. Morgan29
concurred:
It must be borne in mind that this whole statutory scheme
was worked out with the greatest care by members of the Con-
gress thoroughly aware of antitrust problems, often in close con-
tact and cooperation with those who were later to administer the
25. James M. Landis, a member of the Roper Committee and a Commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission, discussed these regulatory goals in various House hearings.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also 78 CONG. Rac. 811 (1934) (statement of
Representative Mapes).
26. The concept of a broadly empowered agency "vas idvocated all but unanimously. See,
e.g., 78 CONG. Rac. 7862 (1934) (statement of Representative Lea advocating strong regulatory
power); id. at 7696 (statement of Chairman Rayburn answering critics of proposed legislation,
who believed the bill gave too much power to administrative authorities). But see id. at 8092
(statement of Representative Sabath supporting a large delegation of power to the existing
administrative agency, the FTC). The SEC itself later recognized the intent of Congress to
grant it very broad powers to effect changes in exchange rules. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
27. Antitrust legislation existing at the time the 1934 Act was considered included the
following: Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311,
38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended by Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 10, 48 Stat. 31; Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
28. Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field, 16 CAsE W. REs.
L. REv. 131, 132 (1964); Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or
Free Competition?, 18 STAN.L. REV. 213, 229 (1965); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws
to the Securities Industry, 10 Wht. & MARY L. Rsv. 136, 146 (1968).
29. 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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intricate phases of this well articulated and comprehensive plan
of regulation of the securities business, and in possession of the
fruits of many prolonged and penetrating investigations. They
intended no exemption to the Sherman Act; and it is hardly
probable that they would inadvertently accomplish such a re-
sult.3
The SEC itself previously had considered its only case focusing
upon the anticompetitive effect of a NYSE rule and anticipated the
later judicial interpretation by holding that a violation of the Sher-
man Act was also a violation of the Securities Exchange Act.31
Since Congress did not exempt the securities industry expressly
from the operation of the antitrust laws and no intention to do so
on the part of the drafters is clearly evident, any immunity must
be founded upon the premise that statutes regulating this industry
impliedly repeal contrary provisions of antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court, however, has opposed strongly repeal by implication of anti-
trust statutes. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,3 2 the
Court stated: "Repeals of the antitiust laws by implication from a
regulatory statute are stiongly disfavored. . . ."13 The Court reiter-
ated the theme three years later in Carnation Co. v. Pacific West-
bound Conference,34 wherein it described antitrust law as a "funda-
mental national economic policy" that "we cannot lightly assume"
to be inapplicable to a particular industry.? The inevitable conclu-
sion from the statute and case law therefore is that the drafters
intended no antitrust exemption. 38
Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
Application of antitrust laws complements the protection which
30. Id. at 697.
31. In re Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270, 273-74, 281, 283, 287-8B, 292
(1941). In the same case, the SEC explicitly stated that it should consider the effects which
enforcement of a particular rule might have on competition. Id. at 287.
32. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
33. Id. at 350.
34. 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
35. Id. at 218. For earlier decisions presenting the indentical view of repeal by implication,
see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
36. The obvious implication of this conclusion is that the antitrust laws do apply to the
securities industry. For examples of the application of antitrust laws to various regulated
industries, see Nerenberg, supra note 28, at 132 n.8.
626 [Vol. 16:621
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the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act intended for investors
through reform and regulation of the securities industry. To achieve
that goal, the Act granted the SEC specific powers, some of which
were aimed at the abuses of the unregulated stock market, such as
the speculation37 and manipulations which were considered the two
major evils at the time of the 1929 market crash.39 In addition to
those provisions, the Act authorized the SEC to regulate the securi-
ties industry directly and to supervise its self-regulation. Success of
the pervasive regulation intended by the Act depends upon the
effectiveness of those powers.
Direct powers of regulation given to the SEC include broad au-
thority to make necessary rules and regulations for the execution of
the functions vested in it by the Act." Among those functions are
the following: approval or denial of an exchange's application for
registration;" segregation and limitation of functions of members,
brokers, and dealers; 2 control of over-the-counter markets;" and
suspension or withdrawal of the registration of a securities exchange
or of a security and suspension or expulsion of a member or officer
of an exchange.4' In conjunction with these powers, the SEC is given
authority to investigate, to seek injunctions, and to prosecute offen-
ses." Though these broad regulatory powers should have established
37. Speculation in the stock market had taken many forms. Among these was the short
sale which the 1934 Act regulated specifically. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). The drafters allowed
the SEC to exempt certain classes of these transactions from a general prohibition. One
example of SEC protection of the right to sell short has been the exemption of the odd-lot
dealer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1974). Another type of speculation controlled by the Act
was the granting of loans by brokers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
38. Manipulation encompasses a multitude of sins, including wash sales, pool operations,
false tips, and stop-loss orders. The Act deals with these abuses in detail. See 15 U.S.C. §
78i (1970).
39. A provision-by-provision analysis of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is beyond the
scope of this Note. The purpose is merely to show, through selected portions of the Act,
whether the intentions of the drafters were achieved. For an in-depth review of the entire Act
see Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CAns. L. REv. 1 (1934); Hanna &
Turlington, Protection of the Public under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 251
(1935).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
41. Id. § 78f(e). The Commission is also granted the power to exempt an exchange from
registration. Id. § 78e.
42. Id. § 78k.
43. Id. § 78o.
44. Id. § 78s.
45. Id. § 78u.
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the pervasive regulatory system desired by the drafters, 6 gaps in
SEC regulatory powers have become evident since 1934, increasing
the significance of the second type of Commission power, supervi-
sion of exchange self-regulation."
Despite dissatisfaction with the ineffective NYSE self-regulation
prior to 1929, the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act refused to
abandon the concept altogether. Instead, they substituted "super-
vised self-regulation" by empowering the SEC to alter or supple-
ment the rules of an exchange with respect to such matters as finan-
cial responsibility of members, reporting transactions on the ex-
change, and fixing reasonable rates of commission."8 Some of these
areas overlap with the provisions of the Act aimed at individual
abuses, but under supervised self-regulation, the SEC can go be-
yond the skeletal provisions of the statute to supervise extensively
the daily operation of the exchanges." Indicative of the failure to
realize the potential of its supervisory power,5" however, is the fact
that the SEC has used that power only once regarding the anticom-
petitive effects of a stock exchange rule.51 Exercise of the statutory
46. At its enactment, commentators hailed the Act as a tremendous experiment in com-
plete regulation by a governmental body. See Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1025, 1037 (1934).
47. Accentuating the importance of the second SEC power, a recent Chairman of the
Commission found it inconceivable that the Government today even could attempt to pre-
scribe a fully detailed pattern of doing business in the securities market. Cary, Self-
Regulation.in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (1963).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)1-13 (1970). There are 13 areas of self-regulation indicated by the
Act, including one entitled "similar matters." While Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated his concept of supervised self-regulation: "Government would keep the shot-
gun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope
it would never have to be used." W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRAcY AND FINANcE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 16 (June 4, 1975), broadened
the Commission's authority to alter or amend the rules of an exchange. See notes 270-77 infra
& accompanying text.
49. "The purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act was to
delegate governmental power to working institutions which would undertake, at their own
initiative, to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal standards in a complex and
changing industry." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
50. See 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrrias REGULATON 1182 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Antitrust and the
Securities Industry: Lessons from the Shipping Industry, 55 CORNEL L. Rav. 96, 100 (1969).
One reason for this failing is that the language of the statute limits the Commission's rule-
changing authority to specific areas and does not authorize the agency to examine exchange
rules before they take effect. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
51. In re Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941). See note 31 supra &
accompanying text.
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powers given to the SEC thus has not fulfilled the statutory objec-
tive of establishing a pervasive regulatory scheme. 2
In addition to the Commission's ineffective use of the powers
given to it by law, the drafters' intent has been frustrated by their
failure to give the SEC jurisdiction to consider individual grievances
resulting from the enforcement of particular exchange rulings. 53
This omission contrasts sharply with the broad grant of power to
alter or supplement rules of the exchanges. Because in practice the
Commission has not reviewed exchange rules before they become
effective,5 it has been virtually powerless to prevent injury which
may result from the implementation of a rule. If enforcement of a
particular rule harms an individual, the SEC cannot correct that
injury by altring the particular rule; its power is limited to chang-
ing the rule prospectively. Additionally, although judicial review of
orders of the Commission is provided in the United States courts of
appeals, the judicial review is from orders of the Commission only,
not directly from exchange rulings pursuant to self-regulation.5 One
result of this particular gap in the legislation has been a series of
antitrust attacks upon exchange rules.
The legislative history and text of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 demonstrate the objectives of the drafters. While they contem-
plated pervasive regulation of the securities industry, this goal was
achieved only in part primarily because of a lack of sufficient power
in the SEC,5 6 the Commission's lack of jurisdiction to hear
individual grievances against stock exchange rules, and a general
52. Former Justice Goldberg stated emphatically that "the statutory scheme of that Act
is not sufficiently pervasive to create a total exemption from the antitrust laws. "Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963).
53. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Bicks, Antitrust and
the New York Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. LAw. 129, 137 (1965); Westwood & Howard, Self-
Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAw & CoNTmsin. PnoB. 518, 525 (1952). The
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 16 (June 4, 1975), granted the SEC
the authority to consider such individual grievances. See notes 262-69 infra & accompanying
text.
54. See note 50 supra. Section 16 of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), now requires the Commission to approve or disapprove a rule
change by formal order.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970). The Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. Id. § 78y(a). Appeal to the court of appeals does not operate
automatically as a stay of the Commission's order. Id. § 78y(b).
56. Some commentators have found the SEC's power under the Act to be illusory. Note,
Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN.
L. Rav. 213, 216-17 (1965); 45 N.C.L. Rzv. 301, 307 (1966).
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vagueness in the statute regarding the intended relationship
between securities regulation and the antitrust laws. This last draft-
manship shortcoming has prompted aggrieved individuals to turn to
the judicial branch in an effort to eliminate anticompetitive ex-
change practices that the Commission has ignored or has been
powerless to correct.
ANTITRUST ATTACKS UPON THE SECURITIES MARKET
The Supreme Court, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,57
began the assault on the regulatory system of the Securities Ex-
change Act by specifying the deficiencies in the scheme and by
accepting for the courts at least partial responsibility for correction
of the deficiencies. In Silver, a nonmember of the NYSE had ap-
plied for, and been granted temporarily, private wire connections
with member securities firms by the Exchange. Without prior no-
tice, the NYSE later refused permanent authorization and ordered
the member firms to remove the connections." Having been handi-
capped seriously by the loss of critical communications, the non-
member firm brought suit against the NYSE for treble damages,
claiming a concerted refusal to deal with it by Exchange members
in violation of the Sherman Act.529
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated firmly its guiding prin-
ciples. First, the Securities Exchange Act provides no express ex-
emption from the antitrust laws." Second, repeal by implication is
disfavored and will be employed "only if necessary to make the
Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary."" Third, the antitrust statutes do not conflict
with the SEC's regulatory function because the Commission has no
jurisdiction over particular applications of exchange rules. 2 Fourth,
while recognizing that some self-regulation within the scope of the
Act may be justifiably anticompetitive, the Court stated that the
57. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
58. Id. at 343-44.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). The Clayton Act allows "[amny person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to seek
treble damages. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
60. 373 U.S. at 357.
61. Id. See also United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (indicating that
absent detailed, comprehensive economic regulation, Court not to imply exemption from
antitrust regulation, but to give effect to both systems of regulation if possible).
62. 373 U.S. at 358. See notes 53.55 supra & accompanying text.
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controverted instance of self-regulation occurred under "totally un-
justifiable" circumstances. 3 The result of the landmark decision
has been the unequivocal recognition that antitrust laws apply, at
least generally, to stock exchange practices,64 although an apparent
judicial desire to limit the case to its facts" has precluded any
avalanche of antitrust attacks upon exchange rules.
One such case, however, was Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers&LIn this
shareholder's derivative suit alleging that the NYSE schedule of
minimum commission rates constituted per se a conspiracy in re-
straint of trade, the district court granted the defendants summary
judgment, the court interpreting the Silver opinion as an explicit
statement that no action by an Exchange, pursuant to its rulemak-
ing authority, could constitute a per se antitrust violation. 7 In a
brief opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the Kaplan decision,68
and the Supreme Court, despite a bitter dissent by Chief Justice
Warren," denied certiorari.
Plentiful subsequent criticism of the Kaplan decision7 may have
63. Id. at 361. The Court stressed the need for notice and hearing to justify anticompetitive
effects of self-regulation. Id. at 361.63.
64. Thus the Silver case provided some of the impetus for the plans to restructure the
securities market. For an excellant analysis of this important case, see Ginsburg, Antitrust
and Stock Exchange Minimum Commissions: A Jurisdictional Analysis, 24 U. Mma L. REy.
732, 739-40 (1970). See also Note, Antitrust laws and the Securities Exchanges, 66 Nw. U.L.
REV. 100, 101-03 (1971); Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law arid Securi-
ties Law: The Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV.
260, 298-301 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Approach]; Note, The Application of Antitrust
Laws to the Securities Industry, 10 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 136, 152-56 (1968).
65. See, e.g., Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967). In Cowen an
employee of a member firm discharged for his alleged involvement in a questionable transac-
tion, brought suit on the grounds of procedural unfairness. The case was dismissed because,
unlike Silver, notice of charges and the reasons for dismissal had been given to the plaintiff.
66. 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. 111. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
954 (1967).
67. 250 F. Supp. at 564. "Since review is afforded within the system of securities regulation,
there is no need to resort to the antitrust laws for a remedy." Id. at 566. The court also
reasoned that Congress was aware of fixed commission rates at the time the Securities Ex-
change Act was enacted; by choosing not to prohibit them, the legislature gave fixed rates
tacit approval. Id. at 564.
68. 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967).
69. 389 U.S. 954 (1967). In his dissent, the Chief Justice characterized the broad, ambigu-
ous language of the court of appeals as a "blunderbuss approach" which fell "far short of the
close analysis and delicate weighing process mandated by this Court's opinion in Silver." Id.
at 957.
70. See, e.g., Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22
STA . L. Ray. 675, 690 (1970): "But Kaplan departed dramatically, and I think wrongly, from
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
been one reason that the same court of appeals altered its analysis
in the next major attack upon a NYSE rule. The exchange practice
to which the plaintiff objected in Thill Securities Corp. v. New York
Stock Exchange71 was the anti-rebate rule, which prohibits a mem-
ber from sharing a commission with a nonmember even if the non-
member originally received the customer's order.72 The district court
had found that the anti-rebate rule was within the scope of self-
regulation authorized by section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act 73 and therefore exempt from antitrust attack.7' Reacting to
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Kaplan, the court of appeals re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the antitrust legis-
lation could be reconciled with the Securities Exchange Act.75 Such
a requirement for specific reconciliation is the very essence of the
Silver decision; its absence in Kaplan is the main reason that case
received heavy criticism. 7 Tacit agreement with Chief Justice War-
ren's dissent in Kaplan perhaps can be inferred from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Thil7" since the result of the denial
was to require the NYSE to justify its anticompetitive conduct as
necessary for the successful operation of the securities laws. The
Thill decision indicates a judicial resolve not to abdicate primary
jurisdiction over the antitrust issue." Industry self-regulation could
Silver when it turned to the merits of the case. No effort was made to answer the question
that Silver said had to be answered: whether fixed minimum commissions were necessary to
make the 1934 Act work." Accord, Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities
Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536, 560-61 (1966): "The fallacy in the Kaplan argument is pointed out
in the PNB [United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)] and California
[California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962)] cases. There it was made clear that the presence of
review power or approval power of one sort or another is not sufficient justification for exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws."
71. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Szo. L. REP. 92,479 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd,
433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
72. 433 F.2d at 266-67. The NYSE claimed that the challenged rule was an essential aspect
of its authorization to fix commission rates under the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 267.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
74. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rm. 92,479, at 98,261.
75. 433 F.2d at 271, 273-74.
76. The change of approach by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, requiring
detailed analysis of the anticompetitive effects of a NYSE rule otherwise apparently within
the scope of legitimate self-regulation, is the basis for a conclusion that Thill reversed Kaplan.
Comment, Antitrust Immunity of the National Association of Securities Dealers Under the
Maloney Act, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 111, 122 (1972).
77. 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
78. See 433 F.2d at 272.
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not justify itself merely by SEC rubber-stamp approval because the
SEC's power of review was delineated unclearly and the expertise
that would support exercise of primary jurisdiction lay in the courts,
not the Commission, for antitrust issues.
Since the decision in Thill, the major point of concern in several
significant cases has been the purported immunity of the self-
regulatory bodies from antitrust laws. In Harwell v. Growth Pro-
grams, Inc. 79 an investment contract provided for an "in and out"
privilege, which allowed a purchaser of mutual fund shares to con-
vert up to 90 percent of his shares into cash, then reinvest the cash
in shares without paying a commission." The National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) issued an interpretation of its rules
which made it a violation for members to cooperate in unlimited "in
and out" privileges. Although the defendant's compliance with the
interpretation effectively denied the plaintiffs a valuable contract
right, the district court gave summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the NASD was immune from antitrust liability.81
Remanding the case for trial on the merits, the court of appeals
assumed arguendo that the defendant's activities normally would
have been violative of antitrust laws82 and found that NASD's pur-
ported antitrust immunity pursuant to the Maloney Acts did not
immunize all association activities. Rather, the court relied upon
Silver to extend immunity to the NASD for the purpose of industry
regulation under SEC authority only when necessary for the effec-
tive operation of the Maloney Act. Having equated the NASD im-
munity with exchange antitrust immunity, the court of appeals then
applied the Silver doctrine to the specific actions before it. It re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the NASD's inter-
pretation was necessary for the effective operation of the Maloney
79. 315 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Tex. 1970), re'd, 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 876 (1972).
80. The contract "permitted the use of the privilege for speculating on short swings of the
market. This resulted in massive withdrawals and reinvestments, often on the same day, and
an alleged dilution of the interests of the other. . . shareholders." 451 F.2d at 243-44 n.1.
81. 315 F. Supp. at 1184.
82. 451 F.2d at 246.
83. 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(n) (1970), provides: 'If any provision of this section is in conflict with
any provision of any law of the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this
section shall prevail." Commentators and courts generally have construed this clause to grant
immunity from the antitrust laws to NASD activity. See, e.g., Approach, supra note 64, at
290-91.
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Act,"4 specifically finding no immunity to arise merely from the
SEC's "close supervision of the NASD in this area." 5 Instead of
limiting the Silver doctrine to its facts, the appellate court in
Harwell thus extended it to another section of the Securities Ex-
change Act and another self-regulatory body.
Not only has Harwell not been followed, however, it has been
cited only in Haddad v. Crosby Corp.," which involved an antitrust
complaint alleging a conspiracy to prevent development of a second-
ary market for the distribution of mutual fund shares. Considering
the application of antitrust laws to statutes controlling the mutual
fund industry,17 the court found it "authoritatively recognized that
the Maloney Act, superimposed upon the regulatory scheme of the
1940 Act, provides a limited immunity for participants in the pri-
mary distribution system of mutual fund shares under SEC-
approved NASD rules."s Moreover, the court added:
Even if a specific exemption granted by the Maloney Act were
deemed to be inadequate to grant immunity from the impact of
the antitrust laws . . . [iln the case at bar ... there exists a
pervasive regulatory scheme coupled with a legislative history
manifesting congressional intent to immunize the investment
company industry from the operation of the antitrust laws to the
limited extent necessary to carry out the purpose of the indepen-
dently defined federal policy legislated in the regulatory act,
i.e., the Investment Company and Maloney Acts."9
This, the court said was the "different case" cited in Silver."' By
finding immunity from antitrust statutes in the pervasive regulation
of the mutual fund industry, the Haddad court implies its own
conformity with Silver, in which the SEC had exercised no system-
atic review, but suggests that the Harwell court incorrectly applied
84. 451 F.2d at 247.
85. Id. For further discussion of Harwell, see 23 Srntcuss L. REv. 956 (1972).
86. 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973).
87. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970); Maloney Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970).
88. 374 F. Supp. at 103.
89. Id. at 109-11.
90. The Silver court reserved judgment on whether an antitrust court could act "[s]hould
review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle other than the antitrust
laws." In such a situation, the Court wrote, "a different case as to antitrust exemption would
be presented." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
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the Silver doctrine to the supervised self-regulatory activities of the
NASD. 91
This apparently sound analysis in Haddad accords with Gordon
v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.9 2 the most recent and perhaps
most definitive treatment of the antitrust issue since Silver. In
Gordon the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found Silver's
"different case ' 9 3 presented in an antitrust challenge to the fixed
commission rate structure employed by the Exchange. The specific
complaint was that volume discounts, competitive rates on portions
of orders in excess of $500,000, and a surcharge on orders below 1000
shares constituted price discrimination, and that fixed rates for all
other trades constituted price fixing.94 Affirming the district court's
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the court of ap-
peals held fixed commission rates to be within the congressional
policy of exchange self-regulation, supervision of which was dele-
gated to the SEC expressly in section 19(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. 5 The court specifically found: "[Both] the language
and the history of the 1934 Act, together with the sound policy
behind supervised exchange self-regulation, mandate the conclusion
that Congress intended to exempt from the antitrust laws the ex-
change practice of fixing commission rates." 8
The court read Silver's discussion of a core of exchange self-
regulation necessary to make the 1934 Act work as necessarily refer-
ring to the 12 practices outlined in section 19(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act; for the court to act in one of these areas would
conflict with a power of review expressly delegated to the SEC and
frustrate or render ineffective the congressional scheme. 7 Ensuring
both fair dealing and the protection of investors in the face of what
would otherwise be per se violations of the antitrust laws was the
task of the Commission, and accomplishment of these goals would
be "too hazardous with two hands on the tiller." 8 Moreover, the
91. 374 F. Supp. at 111.
92. 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 491 (1974).
93. See note 90 supra & accompanying text.
94. 498 F.2d at 1304. The allegation was that such price discrimination violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), and that the fixed commissions constituted
price fixing within the meaning of.the Shermafi Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
96. 498 F.2d at 1305-06.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1308.
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court found that the SEC in fact had exercised wide-reaching, sys-
tematic review and regulation of the controverted fixed commission
rates."
Thill was partially distinguished by the court on the basis that
the anti-rebate rule in the earlier case is not included in the section
19(b) list and thus perhaps not within the "core" of antitrust im-
munity.' 0 The district court in Gordon had noted the absence of a
record of active SEC review in Thill and the danger that the refusal
to share commissions could be used as a weapon against a particular
competitor.' 1 Both the district court and the court of appeals drew
the line there, however, disavowing any intent to imply the exist-
ence of concurrent jurisdiction for the SEC and the courts over all
potentially anticompetitive practices.1 2 For the first time the juris-
diction of the court in securities antitrust cases thus was delineated
and the "different case" question reserved in Silver identified and
resolved. Where the SEC review of self-regulatory body actions is
pursuant to section 19(b) of the 1934 Act and the SEC has main-
tained active review, its jurisdiction is exclusive. In other areas
under the Act, the jurisdiction of the courts is concurrent with that
of the SEC.
The district court which had dismissed Gordon applied this juris-
dictional definition in Jacobi v. Bache & Co.,"03 determining that the
propriety of a service charge, which had been recommended by the
Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange and specifi-
cally approved by the SEC, was within the primary jurisdiction of
the SEC and not subject to direct antitrust attack."4 Nonetheless,
the specific application of the service charge challenged by the com-
plaint, the concerted refusal of NYSE firms to pay registered repre-
sentatives a portion of the charge, was held to be only partly within
the regulatory function of the Commission, since it concerned the
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1310.
101. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 366 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (S.D.NY. 1973).
102. Id.; 498 F.2d at 10. The court of appeals in Gordon was quick to note that by refusing
jurisdiction, it was not leaving the plaintiff without a remedy. Two avenues of review re-
mained: review provided pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704
(1970), and review of a SEC order under 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970). In either case, the court
should consider the weight given by the Commission to anticompetitive factors.
103. 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
104. Id. at 93. The court followed Gordon in determining that the service charge was within
the direct regulatory and supervisory authority of the SEC under section 19(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(b) (1970). 377 F.2d at 93.
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relationship between a member firm and its employees rather than
investor protection.'0 5 Accordingly, the court exercised concurrent
jurisdiction and applied Silver to reconcile the conflicting policies
of the securities laws and the antitrust laws.'' It found that the
service charge was necessary to the operation of the Securities Ex-
change Act, that it constituted neither a price-fixing scheme in its
application to compensation nor any other antitrust violatiQn, and
that its purpose and effect comported with the protection of inves-
tors and the smooth and fair administration of the securities mar-
kets intended by the securities laws."7
The exercise of jurisdiction in Bache seems consistent with that
in Thill, Gordon, and Silver and supports the argument that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not effect a pervasive regula-
tory scheme. Taken together with Haddad,08 these cases put into
perspective the immunity of the NASD activities and cast doubt
upon the application of the Silver doctrine to the NASD in
Harwell.' The court in Bache rejected the defendant's contention
that the SEC had either exclusive or primary jurisdiction;1 other
courts similarly have rejected the claim of primary jurisdiction."1
The Supreme Court, however, has twice addressed the issue, and its
conclusions well could be applicable to the SEC, particularly in
view of the expansion of that body's jurisdiction pursuant to the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.112
The first of the two Supreme Court cases, Ricci v. Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange,"3 arose as an antitrust complaint against the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange for conspiring with its members to deny
the plaintiff membership in violation of Exchange rules and the
Commodity Exchange Act.'" Although remanding the case to the
105. Id. The court extended the holding of Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), that unless the rule came within the SEC's mandate to protect
the investing public and to assure just and equitable trading practices, it would not require
the preemption of conflicting state law. Ware was not applicable directly since in Bache the
conflicting law was federal, not state, law. 377 F.2d at 93.
106. 377 F.2d at 93-95.
107. Id. at 98.
108. See notes 86-91 supra & accompanying text.
109. See notes 79-85 supra & accompanying text.
110. 377 F. Supp. at 93.
111. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 272 (7th Cir. 1970).
112. See notes 249-277 infra & accompanying text.
113. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
114. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (1970).
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trial court, the court of appeals in Ricci stayed further proceedings
pending an administrative determination by the Commodity Ex-
change Commission (CEC). '5 The controversy resembled that pre-
sented in the securities cases: "[C]onduct. seemingly within the
reach of the antitrust laws [was] also at least arguably protected
or prohibited by another regulatory statute enacted by Con-
gress. . . . [T]he other regime includes an administrative agency
with authority to enforce the major provisions of the statute
... "111 But the case differed from Silver and its successors in that
the CEC had obvious jurisdiction and a clear right to judicial review
was provided.1 7
The Supreme Court allowed the agency to make the initial deter-
mination, while it remained ready to act on the antitrust issue after
the Commission made its determination."' In so finding, the Court
reaffirmed the Silver principle regarding implied repeal of the anti-
trust laws, but decided to use the ageny as a factfinder to determine
if the denial of membership was pursuant to a valid exchange rule.
If the Commission found the action violative of a rule, then the
problem would no longer exist; if the Commission upheld the denial
of membership as being pursuant to a valid rule, then the Court
would be in a position to "make a more intelligent and sensitive
judgment as to whether the antitrust laws will punish what an ap-
parently valid rule of the Exchange permits.""' Justice Marshall
dissented, arguing that even if the Commission were to refuse to
invalidate the rules, the decision would mean only that such rules
were not prohibited by a specific provision of the Commodities Ex-
change Act. Such a refusal could not be taken to mean that the rule
serves any useful purpose or that it meets the Silver requirement.
He therefore viewed the conferring of primary jurisdiction upon the
Commission as useless.1 20
115. 447 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1971)
116. 409 U.S. at 299-300.
117. Id. at 301. In Silver, the Court noted the SEC's lack of authority to review specific
instances of enforcement of exchange rules, thus obviating any question of primary jurisdic-
tion. 373 U.S. at 357-58.
118. 409 U.S. at 301-302.
119. Id. at 308.
120. Justice Marshall argued strongly against referring the case to the agency since it would
be unable to resolve all the issues which were raised. In addition, because the Commission
was authorized but tot required to hear the case, its jurisdiction would be merely discretion.
ary. He also argued that the conspiracy complaint was clearly within the jurisdiction of the
- courts without the necessity of any prior factfinding by the Commission. Id. at 309-21.
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What is most significant about the case is the clear assent to the
principle of ultimate review of antitrust matters by the courts. The
majority favored primary jurisdiction in the Commission only be-
cause it ultimately would help the court determine whether the
particular rule merited insulation from antitrust attack. Clearly,
the Silver doctrine is intended to control.12
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and applied Ricci in Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange v. Deaktor.2 - Defending against charges of price
manipulation and failure to enforce its own rules, the Exchange
contended that its actions were taken pursuant to its duty of self-
regulation, that they were within the jurisdiction and oversight of
the Commodity Exchange Commission, and that they were there-
fore beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The Court accepted the
Exchange's argument that the Commission first should be allowed
to determine whether the actions were performed in discharge of the
statutory duty. 23
Lower courts have not attempted to extend the Supreme Court's
holdings in Ricci and Deaktor to invoke the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in securities cases;12 instead they have followed an ap-
proach similar to that of the dissent in Ricci. 12 The role which the
doctrine will serve in securities cases will depend upon develop-
ments outside the judicial branch concerning the regulation of com-
petition in the securities industry. Those extrajudicial develop-
ments are responses to widely recognized problems in the present
structure, and they ultimately may have a greater impact on anti-
competitive practices in the securities industry than any of the judi-
cial attacks premised upon antitrust statutes.
RECENT STUDlES OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
Instability in the securities industry during the late 1960's and the
early 1970's stemmed partially from the late 1960's sales boom
which, because of the inefficiency of brokerage house methods for
handling mass trading, led to an extreme backlog of paperwork, the
121. Another case clearly enunciating this view was Zuckerman v. Yount, 362 P. Supp. 858
(N.D. Ill. 1973), which held that an exchange's membership requirements cannot be immune
from antitrust laws without first passing the Silver test: the anticompetitive rules must be
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work.
122. 94 S. Ct. 466 (1973).
123. Id. at 467.
124. See note 111 supra & accompanying text.
125. See note 120 supra & accompanying text.
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consequent demise of less efficient brokerage houses, a curtailment
of trading hours and days, and a loss of public confidence in the
market.'26 Litigation challenging various aspects of exchange self-
regulation and SEC supervision also increased. Together, these oc-
currences emphasized the overall inability of "supervised self-
regulation" to control effectively the securities market in a manner
envisioned by the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act.
Investigations abounded. The Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970'2 was an early response directing one investigation.ss In
addition, Congress conducted two major investigations;129 the SEC
supported two major studies,'30 published two "white papers" on its
conception of the future of the securities industry,13' and promul-
gated rules which have begun to implement that concept;' 32 and
both the NYSE 33 and the Treasury Department' 34 conducted
studies. These investigations were extremely broad, covering vir-
tually every aspect of the securities markets. The present analysis,
126. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNsoUND PRACTICES, (Letter of Transmittal to Senate and
House of Representatives), in [Special Studies Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. T
74,801, at 65,501 (Dec. 28, 1971).
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1970). Through the Act, Congress provided for the establish-
ment of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), id. § 78ccc(a), which was to
establish the SIPC Fund with an initial balance of not less than $75 million, id. § 78ddd.
The purpose of the fund is to protect customers of registered broker-dealers from financial
loss, to the extent of $50,000 each. Idt § 78fff(f)(1).
128. An SEC study into practicei deemed unsafe or unsound was required by 15 U.S.C. §
78kkk(h) (1970).
129. HousE SuBcoiM. ON COMMERcz AND FINANCs, SEcuRIrIs INDUSTRY STUDY REPORT, H.R.
REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); SENATE Suncomm. ON SECURrTIS, 931 CONG., 1ST
SEss., SECURmTIES INDUSTRY STUDY REPORT (Comm. Print 1973). By July 1973, there were no
fewer than five congressional committees investigating some aspect of the securities industry.
212 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-9 (July 25, 1973).
130. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVEsTOR STUDY REPORT, in [Special Studies Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 74,701 (March 10, 1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR
STUDY]; SEC STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, in [Special Studies Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 74,801 (Dec. 28 1971) [hereinafter cited as UNSOUND
PRACTICES].
131. SEC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS,
in [Special Studies Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 74,811 (Feb. 2, 1972) [here-
inafter cited as FUTURE STRUCruRE]; SEC, POLIcY STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL
MAMr SYSTEM, in 196 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. D-1 (Apr. 4, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
MARM STATEMENT].
132. Rule 17a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15 (1973); rule 19b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973).
133. MARTN, THE SEcuITIEs MAuTs, in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,184 (Aug. 5, 1971) [hereinafter cited as MARTIN REPORT].
134. TREASURY DEPARmENT, PUBUC Poucy FoR AmERIcAN CAPrrAL Mmm'rs (1974).
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however, will concentrate solely on aspects of the various reports
which relate to the competitive structure of the securities markets
and the ineffective system of exchange regulation.
Institutional Investor Study
The first significant report was the SEC's Institutional Investor
Study.'1 Congress, in authorizing the study, expressed concern that
the growing holdings of institutional investors might cause the de-
mise of the auction market with its numerous free buyers and sell-
ers."' The purpose of the study was to determine the effects of such
holdings and transactions by institutional investors upon the main-
tenance of orderly securities markets, upon issuers of securities,
upon the interests of the public, and upon the economy in general.' 3'
One particularly grievous deficiency in market and exchange opera-
tion identified by the study was the fixed minimum commission rate
structure:
As will be apparent from the recurrent references to brokerage
commission rates . .. , the Commission regards non-
competitive, fixed minimum commission rates on securities
transactions of institutional size as the source of a number of
difficulties in the development of institutional investing and the
trading markets for equity securities. The clear conclusion from
the Study Report is that competitive brokerage rates should be
required at least on such transactions.'
The Commission developed objectives regarding the direction in
which it believed the changing market should move. Its goal was a
strong central market system, competitively based, with minimum
restraints on trade. It desired to preserve the virtues of the agency
auction market and to provide equal access rules for all market-
makers and qualified broker-dealers. The central market system
could be formed by using modern communications and data pro-
cessing to link all of the trading markets nationally, while preserv-
135. INSTITUTIONAL INWSTOR STUDY, supra note 130.
136. H.R. Rm'. No. 1665, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
137. Id. at 24.
138. INsTrruToNAL INvESroR STUDY, supra note 130, at 65,314 (emphasis supplied). The
Commission indicated that it already had begun the implementation of this recommendation
by notifying the NYSE thatnegotiated commission rates oninstitutional size orders ($500,000
or more) would be required by April 1, 1971. Id. For further development of the commission
rates issue, see notes 164, 236 infra & accompanying text.
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ing their geographic separation and regional character. The SEC
saw its own role in the formation of the new market system to be
moderately passive: its task would not be to predetermine the struc-
ture, but rather "to observe and, if necessary, to modify the struc-
ture which evolves. . .[if] changes occur that appear inconsistent
with the public interest.""' 9 Clearly in 1971, the SEC did not antici-
pate the abandonment of industry self-regulation to establish itself
as the prime mover in the restructuring of the securities market.
Instead it apparently was ready to sit, watch, and keep the shotgun
ready. 40
The Martin Report
Five months after the Institutional Investor Study was submitted
to Congress, William McChesney Martin completed a study which
the NYSE had commissioned.' Martin, a former Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and a former
President of the NYSE, had obvious qualifications for conducting
such a study. One commentator has suggested, however, that Mar-
tin's background also worked to create a preference for NYSE poli-
cies and procedures and that this preference was evidenced by his
reliance upon the NYSE as the core of his proposed central sys-
tem. 4
2
Martin's suggested solution to the financial and operational ills
of the industry was the creation of a central exchange system as
opposed to the SEC's central market system, developed to provide
a "single, national auction market for each security qualified for
listing.'' 3 A central exchange system would permit equal access for
a maximum number of broker-dealers, 44 but would deny member-
ship to institutional investors.' Implementation of negotiated rates
139. INrSrnu TO INVaTOR STUDY, supra note 130, at 65,335.
140. See Mr. Justice Douglas' view of industry self-regulation, supra note 48.
141. MARTN RPnpr, supra note 133, at 80,555.
142. Martin's major premise, that the NYSE be the "heart and center of all operations of
the national securities market and NYSE procedures. .. [be] the norm for those operations
. ..is never questioned; it is not even made explicit. ." Folk, Restructuring the Securi-
ties Markets-The Martin Report: A Critique, 57 VA. L. Rav. 1315, 1374 (1971).
143. MARm R R oRT, supra note 133, at 80,557.
144. Id. While Martin speaks in favor of access, he limits the access to a "maximum
number" which apparently would not include all. The SEC approach favors access for all who
meet the competency and capital requirements. See notes 171-76 infra & accompanying text.
145. Id. at 80,562.
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would be delayed pending evaluation of his present proposals.14 The
third market, the over-the-counter market in sales of NYSE-listed
stocks made by broker-dealers who are not exchange members,
would be eliminated by requiring stocks to be traded either on the
national auction exchange or on the over-the-counter market, but
not on both. 47 The NYSE would be reorganized to prepare it to serve
as the basic unit of the national exchange system."s Seeking recog-
nition of its quasi-public nature, the NYSE would ask Congress for
antitrust immunity coextensive with the scope of the SEC's control
under the Securities Exchange Act."'
When Martin's study was commissioned early in 1971, the NYSE
was well on its way toward altering its traditional anticompetitive
stance, the Exchange's Committee on Membership Qualifications
already having announced its support for institutional membership
and negotiated rates. After publication of the Martin report, how-
ever, the Exchange reversed its position to adopt again a more anti-
competitive posture.'50
Unsafe and Unsound Practices Study
The next report to appear concerning the securities markets was
the SEC's Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices.' Mandated by
section 11(h) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,52 the
study sought to determine both the causes of and the cures for the
paperwork crisis. It found a wide range of contributing factors,5 3
almost all of which were the result of inadequate self-regulation by
the exchanges, but noted that remedial steps already had been
taken in virtually every problem area. 5 ' Claiming a need for addi-
146. Id. at 80,562-63.
147. Id. at 80,557. The over-the-counter market for unlisted securities, the "second mar-
ket," would remain intact but apparently separate. For a discussion of the various levels of
trading, see Approach, supra note 64, at 261-62.
148. MAmm REPORT, supra note 133, at 80,557-60.
149. Id. at 80,563-64.
150. Folk, supra note 142, at 1350-51.
151. UNsOUND PRtcTiEs, supra note 130.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78kkk(h) (1970).
153. UNSOUND PACnCES, supra note 130, at 65,503. Among these problems were insuffi-
cient capital, insufficient control over securities, inadequate restrictions over the use of cus-
tomer's securities and cash held by the brokerage houses, and inadequacies in recordkeeping,
delivery, clearing, and transfer facilities. Id.
154. Id. at 65,504-07.
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tional legislative authority to complete the task, 15 the SEC sought
the following significant powers: authority to oversee the develop-
ment of a unified securities processing system for clearance, settle-
ment, and transfer of securities; 5 ' authority to control rulemaking
of self-regulatory bodies, to approve or disapprove new rules and
proposed amendments to existing rules, and to abrogate old rules
or require amendments to them;57 authority to enforce directly the
rules of the self-regulatory bodies; " and authority to review all
disciplinary proceedings of self-regulatory bodies either on appeal or
upon its own motion with power to affirm, reverse, or modify the
penalty imposed. "9 The SEC report thus detailed the deficiencies
which had resulted from inadequate self-regulation and supervision,
and outlined remedial amendments to the SEC's grant of power in
the Securities Exchange Act.
SEC Policy Statement on the Future Market Structure
Perhaps at least partly in answer to the Martin Report, the SEC
restated its concept of the central market system and explicated the
methods for effectuating such a central system in its Policy State-
ment on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets. 60 SEC
Chairman Casey stated as the overall objective the creation of
"markets which are public markets, staffed by professionals, retain-
ing the confidence of individual investors. . . , and providing nec-
essary depth and liquidity, by unification and by reliance on compe-
tition within the market structure, not outside it."'1' He identified
three prerequisites for attaining the overall objective: simplicity and
directness of operations in the securities markets; adaptation of the
market to the growing institutional business, while maintaining
155. Id. at 65,508.
156. This requested power would enable the Commission to require standardized proce-
dures and to accelerate automation. With such control over "back office" practices, another
crisis similar to that in the late 1960's could be precluded. Id.
157. Id. at 65,509. Because the SEC's power to control rulemaking by the NASD then was
broader than its power over the exchanges, this provision would bring uniformity as well as a
significant increase in SEC power. Id. See generally Approach, supra note 64, at 284-92. See
also note 212 infra & accompanying text.
158. UNsouD PRAcrnc~s, supra note 130, at 65,509-10.
159. Id. at 65,510. Congress has considered granting all of the powers requested in this
report. See notes 197, 215 infra & accompanying text.
160. FU.Tua STmucruPE, supra note 131.
161. Id. at 65,611.
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confidence and participation of the individual investors; and contin-
ued availability of professional services to investors without any
decline in the standards for such services.6 2 The SEC was confident
that these prerequisites could be met through use of a "central
market system" (CMS), which it defined as follows: "lit is] a
system of communications by which the various elements of the
marketplace, be they exchanges or over-the-counter markets, are
tied together. It also includes a set of rules governing the relation-
ships which will prevail among market participants.1 6 3
Going well beyond the Institutional Investor Study, the SEC an-
nounced its intention to lower further the threshold for requiring
negotiated commission rates to $300,000 in April 1972,114 and deter-
mined that, while institutional membership should not be allowed
for the purpose of recapturing commissions, it should be allowed at
least to the extent of permitting institutional acquisition or estab-
lishment of a broker-dealer who carries on a general business with
the public. 6' Despite a contemplated "unbundling" of commission
rates, 6' the SEC still would require the broker-dealer to include in
162. Id. at 65,611-12.
163. Id. at 65,614. Through the system of communications, all transactions in securities
and all quotations would be made available to all broker-dealers, all of whom would have
access to the market, and all market-makers would compete with each other. Id. The Com-
mission noted that a plan allowing access for nonmembers, though limited by a provision for
a 40 percent discount from prescribed commission rates, had been instituted already by the
NYSE. Id. The third market, rather than being eliminated as the Martin Report had recom-
mended, would be integrated into the central market system. Id. Institution of such a system
would require elimination of NYSE rule 394 which prohibits members from transacting any
business in the third market. See note 182 infra. See generally Note, NVYSE Rules and the
Antitrust Laws-Rule 394-Necessary Restriction or illegal Refusal to Deal?, 45 ST. JoHN'S
L. REv. 812 (1971).
164. Fu'ruR STRucRu, supra note 131, at 65,619. This action allowed commission rates
to be negotiated on the portion of an order which exceeds the breakpoint, which previously
was set at $500,000. The SEC decided that the benefits of competition far outweighed the
evils of negotiated rates. It saw the negative effects of the fixed minimum commission rate
structure to be primarily the dispersion of trading in listed securities to the third market and
the regional exchanges, the development of reciprocal practices of various kinds, and in-
creased pressure for institutional membership. Id. at 65,618-19. Each of these could be elimi-
nated with the elimination of the fixed rates, the final step which the SEC took in January
1975. See note 236 infra.
165. Id. at 65,623. The Commission noted the difficult conflict of interest problems pre-
sented by the allowance of institutional membership and by the presence of broker-dealers
who also engage in money management, but it indicated a belief that these problems should
be resolved by Congress, not by the SEC. rd. at 65,623-24.
166. "Unbundling" is the practice of charging a separate fee for each service, such as
execution or research, which is provided. Id. at 65,620.
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his service, beyond mere execution of a transaction, the evaluation
of its suitability for the customer, with the result that, at least some
portion of the research expense would remain a part of every trans-
action.5 7 In its policy statement, the SEC thus evidenced clear rec-
ognition of the need for competitive commission rates and provided
the first definite guidelines for implementation of the central mar-
ket system.
In late 1972 and early 1973 the SEC moved toward effectuating
its policy statement by promulgating two rules, both concerning
areas considered prerequisite to the establishment of a central mar-
ket system."8 In November 1972, it issued rule 17a-15,111 which re-
quired that the exchanges and the NASD submit plans to the Com-
mission for the nationwide dissemination of prices and volume of all
completed transactions. Providing for such dissemination was be-
lieved to be the necessary first step toward establishment of the
communications network that would be the central market sys-
tem.170 The second effort by the SEC was its promulgation, in Janu-
ary 1973, of rule 19b-2 concerning institutional membership on se-
curities exchanges.' By the rule, initially effective in March 1973
with a three-year period for complete implementation, membership
on all exchanges would be open to all who meet minimum compe-
tency and capital requirements and who do a "predominantly pub-
lic business."1 2 The effect of the limiting phrase is to require that
167. Id. Under the fixed minimum commission rate structure, every customer paid the
same rate and received not only execution of his order, but the support of an organization,
including vast research services. If rates were made competitive, it would be presumed that
some firms would offer "bargain prices" on execution only, enabling the customer to save the
research costs. Here, the SEC placed a minimum limit on services which must be provided
to the customer.
168. For a discussion of the abolition of fixed commission rates by the SEC, see note 236
infra.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-16 (1973).
170. The second part of the communications tie is the quotation system. The only action
yet taken to implement the second step has been the issuance of a proposed rule 17a-14 by
the SEC. See CCH FEa. SEc. L. REP. 1179,931 (Aug. 21,1974). It has been suggested, however,
that the basis of the system already exists in the form of the NASD Automated Quotation
System (NASDAQ), and that its expansion to include NYSE and American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) stocks would provide the desired quotation system. Establishment of the system in
this fashion would save the NYSE an estimated $8 million expense of developing a duplicate
system. See 208 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-10 (June 27, 1973) (remarks of Representative
John Moss). See also Russo & Wang, The Structure of the Securities Market-Past and
Future, 41 FoaR. L. Ra-. 1, 36-41 (1972).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973).
172. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
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the principal purpose of membership be the conduct of public secur-
ities business; such a purpose would be deemed to exist if at least
80 percent of the member's business is performed for or with persons
other than "affiliated" persons. 1 3
The institutional membership rule is among the most controver-
sial developments in the securities industry. In both the House and
the Senate, the 80 percent threshold drew immediate criticism 74
and provoked the introduction in both houses of legislation to nul-
lify rule 19b-2.15 Opponents of the rule also have had some success
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(a) (1973). The definition of "affiliated" has been the source of
a continuing controversy involving the SEC, the NYSE, and both houses of Congress. See
notes 190-91 infra & accompanying text. Under rule 19b-2, the SEC will include within the
80 percent "public" group a series of transactions which otherwise would be deemed non-
public, such as transactions by a registered specialist in a security in which he is so registered.
17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(a) (1973). "Affiliated persons" include those persons "controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with such member, . . . [a]ny principal officer,
stockholder or partner of such member or any person in whose account such person has a
direct or material indirect beneficial interest; and. .. [a]ny investment company of which
such member [or one in a common control position is an] investment adviser. . . ." Id. §
240.19b-2(b).
The rule's control test eliminates the "parent test" of NYSE rule 318, which required the
primary purpose of any member, or the "parent" of any member, to be the transaction of
business as a securities broker or dealer. SEC Securities Exchange ActfRelease No. 9950 (Jan.
16, 1973). A presumption of control exists for all persons with more than 25 percent of the
voting stock of a member and for all persons who are entitled to more than 25 percent of the
profits. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19-2(b) (2) (1973). The presence of investment discretion alone, how-
ever, does not constitute control. Id. Insurance companies managing pension fund assets
through separate accounts, without any other indicia of control, would be deemed to be
conducting a public business. Where the pension fund was an insured plan, the insurance
company would be selling insurance and not money management service, since it would be
investing assets for its own account. This latter type of business therefore would be considered
nonpublic or affiliated. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
174. See 183 BNA Sac. REG. & L. RE. A-2 (Jan. 3, 1973).
175. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. (1973), proposed forbidding any dealings between
broker-dealers and affiliated accounts. Id. § 205. H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., let Sess. (1975),
would have written into the proposed Securities Reform Act of 1975 a general prohibition of
dealings between broker-dealers and affiliated accounts, with specific exceptions. Id. § 105.
It would have granted a three-year grace period for an exchange member who had acquired
that status and the affiliated account by January 16, 1973. Id.
The Senate, taking a different approach from the House, passed S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Seass.
(1973), in June, 1973. It would not have barred institutional membership for at least five years
and would have allowed affiliate trading until April 30,1976, or until no fixed rate commission
structure existed on any exchange, whichever was later. Then, it would have effected a
graduated two-year elimination of affiliate trading, reducing the permissible level to 20 per-
cent, then 10 percent, before finally restricting exchange membership to firms with no affili-
ate trading. Id. § 2. Senate reformers later introduced the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975), which would have retained the gradual prohibition
of affiliate trading, but without reference to a specific termination date. Id. § 5.
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in the courts.'78 Promulgation of the rules, nevertheless, clearly dem-
onstrated the SEC's firm intent to proceed with development of the
central market system and to attack the anticompetitive aspects of
the present system.
SEC Policy Statement on a Central Market System
The SEC's most recent considered treatment of its developing
concept of the structure and regulatory framework for the central
market system was published in April 1973. 17 This statement evalu-
ated the findings of advisory committees established by the previous
policy statement 178 and reviewed results precipitated by rules 17a-
15 and 19b-2. The Commission reiterated the importance of the
communications links, noting progress in the development of a sale
reporting system and a quotation system. 79 The Commission re-
stated its position that the third market should be integrated into
the central market system 8' and that all members of the system
Either of the proposals apparently would have abrogated rule 19b-2. Senator Williams,
introducing S. 249, specifically stated that section five of the proposed Act would require that
rule 19b-2 be withdrawn. 121 CONG. REc. S433 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1975).
176. In March 1973, the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington (PBW) Exchange requested
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to stay rule 19b-2. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC,
485 F.2d (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 94 S. Ct. 1992 (1974). The exchange, with 43 percent of
its trading volume transacted by institutional members who were not in compliance with the
rule, would stand to suffer substantial loss if the rule were allowed to stand. Many of the
member firms of the PBW, as institutional investor affiliates, would be wholly unable to
comply with the 20 percent limit upon affiliate trading. Id. at 720. The court granted the stay
as to the PBW, but the rule, modified to some extent due to the pending litigation, became
effective for the rest of the industry on March 29, 1973, instead of March 15, 1973, as first
promulgated. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10052 (Mar. 22, 1973). Nevertheless,
the ultimate decision of the court in September 1973 was to dismiss the suit brought by the
PBW for lack of jurisdiction. The majority found that the SEC had the option to proceed
either by rule, regulation, or order under section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, but
that section 25(a) allowed review only of an order. 485 F.2d at 733. They found no statutory
authority for direct review in the court of appeals of either a rule or a regulation of the SEC.
Id. That jurisdictional decision made consideration of the merits of the PBW attack on the
SEC's approach to the institutional membership question unnecessary. Id. PBWwas followed
when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused jurisdiction to review
a "rule or regulation." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 258 BNA SEC. REG.
& L. REP. A-11 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 1974).
177. MARKET STAmENT, supra note 131.
178. Among three advisory committees created in connection with the earlier statement
was one to study the central market system. See FuTuRE Smuc ruE, supra note 131, at 65,624-
25.
179. A quotation system had been made the subject of a proposed rule. See note 170 supra.
180. MARKer STATEhm, supra note 131, at D-3.
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should be free to trade in any security eligible for inclusion in the
central market system.'81 The statement further recommended uni-
form rules for exchanges to prohibit the inclusion of anticompetitive
rules such as NYSE rule 394.182 Additionally, each exchange should
increase the maximum level to which nonmembers can negotiate
access to exchanges.Is 3 The SEC has taken no further action to im-
181. Id. at D-4.
182. Id. at D-4 to -5, D-13. New York Stock Exchange rule 394 requires that members of
the Exchange obtain its permission before making a transaction in a listed stock of the
Exchange, either as principal or agent. The effect of rule 394 is to require NYSE firms to trade
in listed stocks, either on the floor of the Exchange or on another registered exchange, and to
prevent these firms from dealing with nonmembers who trade in the third market. The rule
inhibits competition by discouraging transactions off the floor of the Exchange, although a
better deal might be possible elsewhere. HousE SUBcoMI. ON CoiMEcE AND FinANcE, SE-
cuasrs INDusaY STUoDY REORT, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1972).
The goals of eliminating market fragmentation, the scattering of buying and selling inter-
ests to diverse locations, and preserving an auction-agency market would be effected through
the use of two basic trading rules, pursuant to Approach II as recommended by the Advisory
Committee on a Central Market System. SEC, AnvisoRy CoMm. REPORT ON A CENTRAL, MAR-
rtr SYSTEm, 192 BNA Sac. REG. & L. REP. I-1 (March 3, 1973). The Committee had recom-
mended two alternative "Approaches," both of which would retain the concepts of the com-
posite tape, and floor and market specialists. Id. at 1-2, 1-4. Both recognized the advantages
of an auction market and the need for protection of prior public orders, and both would
provide broad access, competition between market centers and all types of market-makers,
and regulations to govern market activity and market-makers. Id. The significant difference
was that Approach I would build on existing, relatively independent, self-regulatory market
centers and link them with communications systems. It would prevent fragmentation by
restricting trading in listed securities to the exchange, thus effectively destroying the third
market. Id. at 1-3. Approach H viewed the central market system as "a network of brokers
and dealers trading in qualified listed securities, who may or may not be exchange members,
operating both from offices . . and on exchange floors, linked together by a real time
communications network. . ."Id. at 1-4. They would be governed by uniform rules under
a new governing body consisting of major exchanges and the NASD. Id. All broker-dealers
would be required to become members of at least one of the self-regulatory bodies, id. at I-7,
and market-makers would be required to register with the market center to which they
belonged, subject to SEC oversight. Id. It was Approach H that met with the Commission's
approval. MAnxnr STATEmENT, supra note 131, at D-3.
The first of two basic rules, the Auction Trading Rule, would provide price priority for
public orders throughout the system. By entering the limit order into a central electronic
respository where it would not be available to the public, and by requiring a broker to check
this repository prior to any transaction, the order would be protected against the execution
of any transaction anywhere else in the system at an inferior price. Id. at D-4. The second
rule is the Public Preference Rule, which would require dealer transactions to be at a higher
purchase price or a lower sales price than available from broker transactions representing
public orders. Id. at D-5.
183. Id. at D-12. The SEC believed the prevailing 40 percent discount on the NYSE to be
inadequate, since reciprocity continued to provide nonmember broker-dealers a partial return
on the commission, thereby making the effective discount greater than 40 percent. Id.
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plement those proposals; nevertheless, the central market system
since has moved closer to realization because of increasing congres-
sional attention to the anticompetitive nature of the securities in-
dustry.
House of Representatives Study
While both houses for some time had been investigating the secur-
ities industry, the House of Representatives was first to publish a
full report.' Finding insufficient enforcement of self-regulatory
rules, generally inadequte regulation of the industry, and a dearth
of competition, the subcommittee made a variety of wide-ranging
recommendations designed both to restructure the industry and to
provide more complete control by the SEC.
Foremost among the recommendations in the report were those
relating to the central market system. Reaffirming most of the con-
cepts set forth by the SEC in its first market statement,'5 the sub-
committee advocated the rescission of NYSE rule 394 and similar
rules and the provision of equal access to all broker-dealers." 6 Mem-
bership in an exchange would be superseded by membership in the
central market system and any broker-dealer would be allowed to
make a market in any security traded within the system. Competi-
tion would be an essential element in establishing the system.'87
Because fixed minimum commission rates were found not to be in
the public interest, competitively determined rates would be re-
quired on all transactions.'1
The major point of departure from the SEC position concerned
the question of institutional membership. The House subcommittee
proposal would remove all bans on institutional membership, seek-
ing the broadest possible participation in the market and requiring
only that all broker-dealers meet minimum competency and capital
requirements. 9 Seeing more harm than good, however, in the 80
184. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FNANcE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY REPORT, H.R.
REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as HousE STUDY].
185. Id. at 123-30. See notes 160-73 supra & accompanying text. These concepts are the
creation of a consolidated tape and composite quotation system, removal of barriers to compe-
tition between potential central market system members, and uniformity of exchange rules
and regulations. HousE STUDY, supra note 184, at 123.
186. HOUSE: STUDY, supra note 184, at 123. See note 182 supra & accompanying text.
187. HOusE STUDY, supra note 184, at 128.
188. Id. at 131-46.
189. Id. at 148.
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percent rule provided by SEC rule 19b-2,11 the subcommittee would
recognize the conflicting interests of broker-dealers who manage
money and money managers who desired to be broker-dealers by
forbidding all transactions by a broker-dealer for an affiliate."' Fi-
nally, the report addressed the scope of the antitrust immunity
afforded to the industry by the Securities Exchange Act and the
regulatory scheme administered by the SEC. Contrary to the re-
peated assertions of the NYSE and the SEC,19 the subcommittee
decided that the Supreme Court quite clearly had answered the
question in Silver.'93
The practical outcome of the House report was the introduction,
in March 1973, of an omnibus securities bill, the Securities Ex-
change Act Amendments of 1973.111 The provisions designed to fos-
ter competition in the securities industry were reintroduced as the
Securities Reform Act of 1975111 which adopted the House report's
major provisions, including a grant to the SEC of direct authority
190. Id. at 151-52. In a letter to each exchange on February 15,1972, the SEC had proposed
that the exchanges amend their rules to prohibit membership to firms whose primary func-
tion is to redirect, rebate, or recapture commissions; to eliminate any "parent" test for
exchange membership; and to restrict membership to firms doing the "predominant portion"
of their business for "non-affiliated" customers. The Commission, while voicing openness on
the meaning of the term "predominant," opined that it would require approximately 80
percent public business. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.. L. RP'. 78,529 (Feb.
15, 1972). When the exchanges showed reluctance to accomplish these suggested amend-
ments, the SEC proposed rule 19b-2, which would require the amendments to be made.
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1178,929 (Aug. 3, 1972).
191. HousE STUDY, supra note 184, at 148-49. This resolution of the problem effectively
would disallow any trading for affiliates by exchange members. The subcommittee believed
the SEC rule would have undesirable effects, such as forced mergers of firms, adverse impact
upon regional brokerage firms, bookkeeping problems, and "churning" of public accounts in
order to stay at the 80 percent level. Id. at 151-52. None of these problems would arise under
a complete prohibition of affiliate trading. Id. at 152.
One additional difficulty with either rule is the definition of "affiliated." The NYSE pro-
posed to define it to exclude "pension funds" but not other types of money management,
such as mutual funds. Id. at 151. The House subcommittee found that NYSE interpretation
to be discriminatory against non-NYSE members and institutional investors. Id. Later inter-
pretations, among them SEC rule 19b-2, included non-insured pension funds of insurance
companies in the non-affiliated classification, but considered insured funds to be affiliated
business. See note 173 supra.
192. See, e.g., SEC Reply Memorandum, Thill See. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 205
BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. E-1 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
193. HousE STUDY, supra note 184, at 160-61. See notes 57-63 supra & accompanying text.
194. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
195. H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The provisions of the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), include the essential elements of the House
bill. See notes 233-77 infra & accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:621
over the rules of the exchanges and the NASD.' 6 It would have
authorized review by the SEC of all exchange actions which refuse
membership or which discipline members,' 7 and it would have di-
rected the SEC to take steps to establish a national central market
system."98
Senate Study
Paralleling the House study, the Senate securities subcommittee
spent 18 months delving into the securities industry before publish-
ing its report in February 1973."'9 In the study, the subcommittee
found that lax enforcement of industry and SEC rules, especially
those pertaining to net capital requirements, contributed to the
paperwork crisis of the late 1960's.1°° Because the SEC already had
taken action toward terminating exemptions from the financial re-
sponsibility rules and had raised the net capital requirements, no
corrective legislation was deemed necessary. 0' The subcommittee
believed that the proper pricing mechanism should be competition,
rather than fixed commission rates which were deemed to be artifi-
cial incentives for taking transactions from one market to another
to reduce or recover commission charges.112 Judging from the experi-
ence of the earlier introduction of competitive rates for transactions
involving more than $500,000, reliance upon competiton to set rates
was thought to provide an end to the artificial incentive while hav-
ing no adverse effect upon market liquidity.23 Again, however, the
196. H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102-09 (1975).
197. Id. § 102. The four powers requested by the SEC at the conclusion of their Unsound
Practices Study all would have been granted by the bill. See notes 155-59 supra & accompany-
ing text.
198. H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 501 (1975).
199. SENATE Suscomi. O N Sscvrrlms, 93D CoN., IST SEss., SEcurniEs INDUSTRY STUDY
REPORT (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as SENATE STUDY].
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id. at 4-5.
202. Id. at 6. Although the common law duty of the broker is to obtain the best execution
of the transaction for the customer, the fixed commission rates on the NYSE, coupled with
rule 394, prevented brokers from fulfilling this duty. The Senate subcommittee would elimi-
nate rule 394 and all similar restrictive rules in conjunction with eliminating the use of fixed
rates. These two proposals would be instrumental in the formation of a central market
system. See Russo & Wang, supra note 170, at 21.
203. SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 6-7. Liquidity refers to the ease with which an
investor may convert his securities into cash. A traditional argument of the NYSE has been
that the elimination or serious modification of the auction market would result in a loss of
the ability of the market to absorb selling when there is no buying and a loss of liquidity.
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subcommittee did not regard legislation as necessary since the SEC
was moving toward further reduction of the breakpoint to $100,000
by April 1974.24
The Senate study found the question of institutional membership
to be tied to the issue of fixed commission rates. The NYSE, it
noted, had approved expansion of brokerage houses into money
management, while denying admittance of money managers to the
exchange. Not only did that decision give the brokers a competitive
advantage, but it suggested conflicts of interest.25 Reflecting as
much dissatisfaction with the Martin Report's espousal of the
status quo as with the SEC's 80-percent rule,0 6 the subcommittee
would prohibit any business transactions by brokers with affiliates
or with managed institutional accounts of any class. This proposal
was modified, however, by the time the Senate approved legislation
affecting institutional membership. 207
Envisioning the central market system as a marriage of the best
of the auction market, with its centralized trading, and the dealer
market, with its market-making strength, the Senate subcommittee
generally concurred in the SEC proposals. It noted that 17 percent
of the trading in NYSE-listed stocks during the surveyed time pe-
riod was conducted away from the floor, either on the regional ex-
changes or in the third market.208 Discounting the NYSE's fears of
further fragmentation of trading, the subcommittee chose not to
impede the competitive tendency.29 It saw as the primary objective
This argument is basic to the NYSE's advocacy of a national central exchange system with
the NYSE as the core, especially since the NYSE sees itself as an auction market, See MARmN
REPoFT, supra note 133, at 80,556; Folk, supra note 142. See generally Russo & Wang, supra
note 170; Note, NYSE Rules and the Antitrust Laws-Rule 394-Necessary Restriction or
Illegal Refusal to Deal?, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 812 (1971).
204. SENATE STmUy, supra note 199, at 5. See note 236 infra.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 9. The Senate subcommittee was as critical of the SEC's definition of "affili-
ated" as it was of the rest of the SEC approach. Pension funds managed by a broker would
be considered unaffiliated business by the SEC, while those funds managed by an insurance
company would be deemed affiliated. See notes 173, 190-91 supra & accompanying text. Such
a definition would perpetuate the competitive unfairness between different groups of money
managers. SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 9.
207. S. 470, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973), passed by the Senate in June 1973, would not bar
such affiliated transactions until after fixed commission rates were no longer present on any
exchange. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), incorporated that provision as section 5.
See note 175 supra.
208. SENATE STuDY, supra note 199, at 10.
209. Id. Although fragmentation has been a major NYSE fear because of the potential
19751
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the linking of all of the market facilities in which a particular stock
is traded to provide potential buyers and sellers with composite
reporting of transactions in and quotations for that security to facili-
tate the execution of orders.2 ° Supervision of the market would
require regulation or legislation to ensure priority for public orders,
to strengthen the market's ability to handle large block trades, and
to govern the activities of the dealers and other professionals operat-
ing within the system.211
To augment control over the market and over the self-regulatory
bodies in particular, the subcommittee would modify the Securities
Exchange Act to give applicants for exchange membership the same
right to a hearing and to SEC review which applicants to the NASD
now have under the Maloney Act;212 exchange members who are
disciplined also would have a right to such review. The SEC would
gain authority to disapprove or modify exchange disciplinary proce-
dures 13 as a part of the subcommittee's effort to emphasize that all
exchange and NASD self-regulatory authority is subject to SEC
review.2 1  Additional powers requested by the SEC in its study of
unsound practices were considered, 215 but the Senate subcommittee,
unlike the House subcommittee, 216 saw no reason for the SEC to
enforce directly the rules of the self-regulatory bodies or to increase
the penalty imposed when the Commission reviews disciplinary pro-
reduction of depth and liquidity, it could provide the public with lower charges and better
broker-dealer performance. See note 203 supra.
210. SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 10-11. The principal difficulties foreseen in imple-
menting the system were the obtaining of necessary agreements among the exchanges and
the NASD and the elimination of restrictive rules such as NYSE rule 394. The Senate felt
that both of those difficulties should be resolved by December 31, 1973. Id. at 11. The study
endorsed the proposal of a "neutralbody" vendor of required market information as presented
by the SEC in rule 17a-15. Id. at 10.
211. Id. at 11-12.
212. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1970). The Act gives the SEC power to review actions taken by
a national securities association by which any member or other person is aggrieved. The
absence of any similar power of review regarding the securities exchanges has led to the
various collateral attacks on exchange actions, especially in the antitrust area. See Approach,
supra note 64, at 290.
213. SENATs STUDY, supra note 199, at 14.
The subcommittee also noted that those procedural safeguards required by the Supreme
Court in Silver to be given to nonmembers by the exchanges had not been provided. There-
fore, statutory amendment would be the appropriate means to assure this protection. Id. at
14-15.
214. Id. at 15.
215. Id. at 16.
216. See note 197 supra.
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cedures. 2 7 Power for the Commission to disapprove or to require
changes to rules of self-regulatory bodies was approved, however. 2 8
Examining previous litigation, the Senate subcommittee found
that judicial review had been limited unduly by statutory gaps and
by the SEC's excessive reliance upon procedural technicalities,
leading to a proliferation of collateral attacks premised upon anti-
trust or due process issues; 29 the subcommittee would amend the
law to establish clearly the availability of direct judicial review.2 0
Regarding the function of the judiciary in antitrust matters and the
antitrust immunity of the securities industry, it found the Silver
doctrine to be quite clear, the subcommittee seeing no merit in the
SEC's argument that Commission approval of self-regulatory action
should immunize the industry from antitrust attack.2
Legislation introduced in the Senate as a result of its study came
first in the form of several bills rather than as one omnibus bill as
in the House.222 In the 94th Congress, Senate reformers introduced
the Securities Acts Amendments of 19752 as a consolidation of the
several bills which had passed the Senate in the previous Congress
to implement the proposals contained in the Senate study. The
institutional membership provisions of the bill would have phased
out trading for affiliates over a period of years, but only after the
discontinuance of fixed commission rates by all exchanges.24 The
proposed legislation would have given the SEC the regulatory au-
thority to review disciplinary actions and denials of membership by
the self-regulatory bodies,2"' to discipline these bodies for failures to
217. SNATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 16-17.
218. Id. at 16.
219. Id. at 18-19. Such a technicality was used effectively by the SEC to avoid review of
rule 19b-2 in PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), in which the court
of appeals determined that it could review an order, but not a rule, under section 25 of the
Securities Exchange Act. See note 176 supra.
220. SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 18.
221. Id. at 19.20.
222. Four major bills were introduced in the 93d Congress: S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) (passed by the Senate on June 18, 1973); S. 2058, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (passed
by the Senate on Aug. 1, 1973); S. 2474, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (passed by the Senate on
Sept. 16, 1974); S. 2519, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (passed by the Senate on May 27, 1974).
223. S. 249, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), essentially enact the Senate bill. See notes 233-77 infra &
accompanying text.
224. Id. § 5(b). See note 175 supra.
225. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975), amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The bill also would have required the institution of the minimum procedures for
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enforce their own rules,22B and to "abrogate, add to, or delete from"
the rules of these bodies. 2 7 Seeking establishment of a central mar-
ket systems8 the bill would have amended the Securities Exchange
Act to guarantee the SEC the authority to regulate securities com-
munications systems,29 to remove competitive restraints, 30 and to
control the activities of market-makers operating in the third mar-
ket.231 The agency also would have been able to approve trading of
unlisted securities on an exchange; 232 stocks then would gravitate
toward the type of market, whether auction or dealer, that is war-
ranted by their trading characteristics.
The events of the twelve years since Silver, particularly of the last
five years, thus have forced a new awareness of the problems of the
securities industry and a search for possible remedies. Through all
of the various reports and most of the court decisions has run a
recognition that the need to centralize and modernize the industry
is acute, and that this modernization must restore competition as a
prime force in the market by a legislative determination of the ap-
propriate role for the SEC, both in relation to the industry and in
relation to the antitrust jurisdiction of the courts.
due process which the Silver court set down: notice of any final action by any self-regulatory
body which is adverse to either a member or a nonmember would have been filed with the
SEC and would have been reviewable by that agency. S. 249,94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1915),
amending § 19(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
226. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975), adding § 19(h)(1) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
227. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sees. § 15 (1975), amending § 19(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The bill would have required the Commission to review any proposed amend-
ments to the rules of a self-regulatory body in a formal rulemaking procedure with notice and
hearing. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975), amending § 19(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. A similar procedure would have accompanied any attempt by the SEC to amend
a rule. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975), amending § 19(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The proposed legislation also would have permitted a person adversely affected
by a rule of the SEC to seek judicial review of that rule. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19
(1975), amending § 25(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
228. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1975), would have amended section 2 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, to add a further purpose for the Act: "to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities. .. ."
229. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975), adding § llA to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
230. S. 249, 94th Cong., Ist Seass. §§ 4, 11(b), 15, 17 (1975), amending §§ 6, 15A, 19, 23 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
231. S. 249; 94th Cong., 1st Seass. § 11(d) (1975), amending § 15(c)(5) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
232. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1975), adding § 12(f)(1)(C) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.
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RESOLUTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
With the background of developing case law and congressional
and administrative studies, the proposals before the 94th Congress
culminated in the passage of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975,2s3 which is essentially the Senate version with only minor
changes.? The final Act embodies a recognition of the need for
reorganization of the industry to increase compliance with antitrust
policy while protecting the interests of the participants in securities
trading and addresses the three central anticompetitive problems:
institutional membership, a central market system, and SEC pri-
mary jurisdiction.
Institutional Membership
At the heart of the reorganization lies the question of institutional
membership on the exchanges and the related issue of the appropri-
ate method for setting commission rates on institutional-size trans-
actions. The impetus for institutions to gain exchange membership
has been the desire to recoup the'large commissions paid to ex-
change members under the fixed commission rate structure.25
Abolition of the fixed rate structure by the SEC in January 197526
thus should end one aspect of the long-running controversy. 2r Some
incentives will remain, nonetheless, for money managers and
broker-dealers to be able to perform overlapping functions.3n The
233. Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 1975).
234. See notes 223-32 supra & accompanying text.
235. The Senate subcommittee recognized that the developing pressures for exchange
membership by financial institutions was the result of fixed commission schedules that fail
to account for the economies of scale involved in large transactions. SENATB STUDY, supra note
199, at 64.
236. The SEC has adopted rule 19b-3 which prohibits the national securities exchanges
from requiring their members to charge fixed commission rates for transactions conducted
on the exchanges. The prohibition became effective May 1, 1975, for public rates, those which
exchange members charge on transactions for nonmembers, and a similar prohibition will
become effective May 1, 1976, for floor brokerage rates, those charged to exchange members.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,203 (Jan. 23, 1975). For the text of rule 19b-3, see CCII
FED. SEC. L. REP. 26,284 (Jan. 29, 1975).
237. For discussion of this issue, see Baxter, NYSE Rxed Commission Rates: A Private
Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. Ray. 675 (1970).
238. Institutional investors sometimes desire affiliation with a broker-dealer to diversify
the scope of their financial business, while at the same time providing an additional source
of capital to the broker-dealer. Broker-dealers desire to engage in money management to
obtain a steady source of income to supplement cyclical brokerage income. Additionally, with
19751
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
SEC's rule 19b-2, although limiting the extent to which such com-
bined services can be performed by exchange members, fails to safe-
guard against the abuses inherent in such a combination of func-
tions."' The better remedy, that adopted in the 1975 Act,20 uni-
formly prohibits exchange members and their affiliates from con-
ducting transactions for any account which they manage. That pro-
posal comports with antitrust policy because it opens exchange
membership to all who meet the requisite competency and capital
standards. Furthermore, the limitation upon the type of- customer
a member may serve is within the scope of the Securities Exchange
Act and in compliance with the antitrust laws since it furthers the
protective purpose of the Act while fostering no competitive imbal-
ance among competing money managers. A long phase-in period, as
provided in the 1975 Act,24' will facilitate compliance to avoid
complaints such as that brought against rule 19b-2 by the
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Exchange. 22
The Central Market System
Resolution of the fixed commission and institutional membership
controversies will eliminate a number of deficiencies that have pro-
voked antitrust complaints against the securities industry. In light
of the changes in the market structure portended by the various
studies and the anticompetitive effects of present regulation, how-
ever, it is necessary to fashion a market structure that will maximize
the internalized brokerage function, the institutional investor may reduce his transactional
expense by avoiding payment of a commission to an independent profit-seeking broker. SRLR
Comment, 221 BNA Sac. REG. & L. REP. A-2 (Oct. 3, 1973).
239. The abuses inherent in the combination of the brokerage and money-management
functions are primarily due to the conflicting interests of the persons who perform both
functions. For a discussion of these various abuses, including "churning" accounts, dumping
inventory into managed accounts, and discrimination against certain customers, see SF.NATE
STuny, supra note 199, at 75-77.
240. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6 (June 4, 1975). The Act does recognize certain limited excep-
tions to the broad prohibition. Id.
241. The Act includes a delay until May 1, 1978, in the effectiveness of the prohibition for
transactions on an exchange by a member who had that status on May 1, 1975. Id.
242. See note 176 supra.
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competition. Because of the nearly unanimous sentiment in favor of
its development,2 3 including sanction in the 1975 Act,214 the central
market system appears to be the structure of the securities market
of the future.
By providing potential buyers and sellers with instant awareness
of all transactions and quotations in a particular security, the cen-
tral market system can intensify competition among market-makers
and yield the traditional free market advantages as competing
market-makers, required to deal in volume to maximize profits,
try to attract business by bidding higher or offering lower than their
competitors. 5 Instant communication of all quotations also will
have the effect of reducing spreads between bids and offers as the
investing public increases its awareness of available bids and
offers. 28 Implementation of the system will contribute further to
competition since it should require elimination of anticompetitive
rules, such as NYSE rule 394, pursuant to expanded SEC regulatory
powers. Whether elimination of the anticompetitive exchange rules
should precede implementation of a composite quotation system
may be a debatable question, but the weight of argument would
seem to favor altering the exchange rules at the time that the com-
posite system is implemented.247 Market fragmentation is the prin-
cipal result of the present limited market-maker competition, fos-
tering trading imbalances and reducing market liquidity; with a
central market system, market-making capacity should increase,
adding to the liquidity and depth of the marketplace. 28
243. The SEC, the Senate, and the House have all indicated in reports that they support
development of a central market system. MAmr STATFmENT, supra note 131, at D-1. HousE
STuny, supra note 184, at 117-30; SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 89-105. But see MARTIN
REwoirr, supra note 133, at 80,557.
244. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7 (June 4, 1975), adds section 11A to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, a new section devoted to a national market system, which states that the SEC
is "directed... to use its authority under this title to facilitate the establishment of a
national market system for securities. . ." Id.
245. Interestingly, beneficial results have been realized from the market competition cre-
ated by the desire to attract institutional investors. This competition was a major inducement
for NYSE acceptance of competitive commission rates, and it has reduced the spread between
bid and asked prices for NYSE-listed stocks in transactions involving competing market-
makers. SENATE STunY, supra note 199, at 93-94.
246. MAP.E STATEiENT, supra note 131, at D-2, D-3.
247. The quotation system is fundamental; without its implementation the central market
system remains only an expectation. The existence of rule 394 would be wholly inconsistent
with the philosophy of the central matket system, and its continued existence after the
quotation system is in operation would destroy the effectiveness of that system. Id. at D-13.
248. Id.
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SEC Primary Jurisdiction
These various changes in the market structure will contribute
significantly to increased competition in the securities industry.
Provisions of the 1975 Act 29 recognize that certain changes in the
regulatory system were needed, however, to assure expeditious and
appropriate resolution of issues involving competition without the
necessity of collateral antitrust attack in the courts. Vesting the
SEC with authority to review the actions of the self-regulatory bod-
ies can replace much of the antitrust litigation with direct judicial
review of Commission activities and force the SEC to accept the
regulatory role envisioned for it by the drafters of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Discussions of such a system often have
arisen in the context of granting an administrative agency primary
jurisdiction to determine whether self-regulatory action complies
with antitrust laws. Professor Davis, discussing the question of
agency primary jurisdiction in antitrust cases, indentified some of
the advantages of administrative review.211 He observed that the
problem is not simply the application of antitrust laws, but the
accommodation of antitrust policy with regulatory policy.2 2 Despite
the disaffinity for repeal by implication apparent in its Silver deci-
sion, the Supreme Court recognized that antitrust law should be
relaxed to the extent necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act
work.213 That recognition, combined with Professor Davis' further
comments, supports the propriety of initial SEC review:
The courts are obviously well equipped to make initial decisions
involving application of the antitrust policy. But, before the
particular regulatory agency has defined the particular regula-
tory policy in the particular case, the courts are not well
equipped to make initial decisions involving accommodation of
the antitrust policy to the regulatory policy . . . . After the
agency has thus provided a better basis for judicial judgment,
the courts may exert their power of judicial review, including the
249. Section 16, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), enlarges the SEC's oversight
authority, previously contained in section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
250. E.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); Chicago Mercantile
Exch. v. Deaktor, 94 S. Ct. 466 (1973).
251. 3 K. DAvis, ADmUiSTRATIW LAW TnEnsE § 19.05, at 25 (1958).
252. Id. See also McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67,94 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
253. See note 61 supra accompanying text.
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determination of such questions as whether or not the agency
has given excessive or insufficient weight to the advantages of
competition.2
The concept of SEC review is supported further by the inhibitory
effect that the apprehension of antitrust liability has upon the self-
regulatory bodies. The Martin report indicated that the fear of tre-
ble damages as a result of good faith regulatory action inhibits the
self-regulatory bodies in fulfilling their statutory mandate.25 Al-
though preliminary agency review would not, and should not,26
immunize self-regulatory action from judicial examination of
potentially anticompetitive activities,27 it can reduce considerably
such inhibitory fears inasmuch as the convenience of administrative
review for an aggrieved party should reduce the desirability of anti-
trust litigation. A requirement that the SEC provide a complete
statement of its reasons and findings would facilitate judicial bal-
ancing of the competing policies involved when the SEC supports
the contested self-regulatory action.P If the SEC disagrees with the
self-regulatory action, the 1975 Act permits the Commission to enter
an order against the action or to supplant it with its own rule. 9 The
inhibition of the self-regulatory bodies resulting from the threat-of
treble damages in antitrust litigation in any event should be re-
duced. Action taken by a self-regulatory body pursuant to an SEC
directive should not constitute an unlawful conspiracy since it is
taken to comply with governmental authority.20
Additional support for SEC review of industry self-regulatory ac-
tivities arises from the potential contribution of such review to an
orderly regulatory system. Confusion generated by collateral anti-
trust attack as a result of the differing positions of the various dis-
trict courts on antitrust issues may be reduced since initial review
by the Commission often may determine that the self-regulatory
254. 3 K. DAvis, supra note 251, § 19.05, at 25.
255. MAIriN RE oRT, supra note 133, at 80,563-64.
256." See 3 K. DAvis, supra note 251, § 19.05, at 24-25.
257. Section 20, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 20 (June 4, 1975), amends section 25 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 to broaden judicial review of the SEC's increased authority.
258. Section 16 of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June
4,1975), requires the Commission to approve or disapprove a proposed rule change by formal
order, but does not require explicitly a formal statement of reasons and findings.
259. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), amending § 19(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1936). Cf.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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action was unjustified under the securities law, thereby eliminating
any need to resort to the courts. 6 1
In delineating specific areas where SEC review should be pro-
vided, policymakers have divided the self-regulatory bodies' pro-
ceedings into actions directed against particular persons and actions
directed toward establishing general policy. The Securities Ex-
change Act provides for SEC review of NASD disciplinary actions,
upon the initiative of the SEC or upon petition of an aggrieved
person.262 No such review was provided for disciplinary actions taken
by the exchanges, however, although no rationale is apparent for the
distinction. By the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Congress
amended the 1934 Act to provide SEC review of exchange discipli-
nary actions, 6 3 because the competitive policy considerations in-
volved render such determinations subject to attack by antitrust
litigation. Similarly, review of denials of NASD membership is pro-
vided,2 16 but until the 1975 Act there was no review of similar ex-
change action.25 As noted by the Senate subcommittee in its study
report: "[lit will become increasingly important as the industry
moves toward a central market system to assure that no qualified
broker or dealer is denied access to the system at any point at which
he may wish to enter it. This means. . . that the SEC must have
the authority to review adverse self-regulatory actions to insure that
a denial of membership is not capricious or discriminatory." 26 De-
nial of membership is a subject for judicial scrutiny because of the
competitive implications of such refusals, but prior SEC review of
these actions should eliminate the need for collateral antitrust at-
tack.
Actions taken against nonmembers can involve antitrust policy as
much as can actions taken against members. The Silver case enun-
ciated the requirement that such actions be accompanied by proce-
dures affording the adversely affected party notice, hearing, and an
opportunity to answer.267 Since such procedures never have been
261. See notes 113-120 supra & accompanying text for a discussion of a similar situation
under the Commodity Exchange Act.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3g (1970).
263. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3g (1970).
265. Pub. L. No. 9429, § 16 (June 4, 1975), amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
266. SENATE STUDY, supra note 199, at 154.
267. See notes 60-65 supra & accompanying text.
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adopted by the self-regulatory bodies,68 Congress required them in
the 1975 Act and afforded SEC review to an aggrieved party to
assure full administrative analysis of the competing policies in-
volved.2ss
Although their actions toward particular persons in individual
circumstances obviously can hamper competition, the self-
regulatory bodies also can affect competition through their broad
authority to promulgate rules which establish general policy. The
Securities Exchange Act only scantily defined the scope of that
rulemaking authority. With respect to securities exchanges, the Act
gave broad license: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prevent any exchange from adopting and enforcing any rule not
inconsistent with this chapter .... ,"20 As a result of such unde-
fined rulemaking authority, exchanges have made rules in areas
requiring economic determinations which clearly involve antitrust
policy. Because, in the past, the extent of SEC power to review and
alter rules promulgated by the self-regulatory bodies was unclear,
Congress expressly empowered the SEC to review and alter the rules
of the exchanges and the NASD upon the initiative of the Commis-
sion or upon the petition of an aggrieved party?' Providing the SEC
the power to review those rules can reduce the need for antitrust
attacks. To facilitate SEC review, Congress has required the self-
regulatory agencies to provide a statement of the basis and purpose
of all rules, 2 - comparable to that required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. 3 This requirement can eliminate delays caused by
SEC requests for additional information and stimulate public com-
ment concerning proposed rules.
In its review of those rules, the SEC has-been required by the 1975
Act to enter a formal order approving or disapproving the rule.24 A
complete statement of the Commission's findings and reasons will
268. Intercontinental Indus. Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940-41 (5th Cir.
1971).
269. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970).
271. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June 4, 1975), amending § 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
272. Id.
273. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
274. Section 16 of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16 (June
4, 1975), requires the Commission to approve or disapprove a proposed rule change by formal
order, but does not require explicitly a formal statement of reasons and findings.
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facilitate judicial review of SEC action and increase public. confi-
dence in the review system. Previously, much of the SEC policy-
making has been conducted in private meetings with the self-
regulatory agencies.2 15 Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion in SEC v.
Chenery Corp. 276 stated the need for expressed reasons and findings
by the SEC:
[T]he courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they
are advised of the considerations underlying the action under
review .... [I]f the action is based upon a determination of
law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come
into play, an order may not stand if the agency has miscon-
ceived the law .... [Tihe orderly functioning of the process
of review requires that the grounds upon which the administra-
tive agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.
"The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity
in its exercise."" 7
To the extent that SEC review is to achieve the objective of elimi-
nating collateral antitrust attack, the agency must make available
its findings regarding the reconciliation of the securities laws and
the competitive policies of the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust litigation concerning the securities industry over the
past decade has made apparent the inability of the regulatory sys-
tem. to assure maximum competition while maintaining an orderly
regulatory process. Exhaustive studies, particularly those con-
ducted for Congress, culminated in the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975, a bill well designed to remedy the deficiencies now
so apparent in the 1934 Act. The recent legislation demonstrates
that substantial agreement exists concerning enhancement of com-
petition through the implementation of the central market system
and will enable the industry, under the active supervision of the
SEC, to become more competitive. The 12 years years since Silver
have demonstrated the haphazard and irresolute development of
competitive standards, inherent in a system which provides only
275. Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New
York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811, 812 (1971).
276. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
277. Id. at 94, quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
[Vol. 16:621
1975] SECURIMES COMPETITION 665
collateral attack to settle grievances. The grant of review power to
the SEC will ensure not only cohesive and coherent progress toward
vigorous competition, but also will guarantee a hearing to all ag-
grieved parties. The requirement that the SEC speak in formal
orders, moreover, will curtail avoidance of judicial review on techni-
calities or terminology.7 8 Finally, by invoking primary jurisdiction
in those cases brought directly to the courts, the benefits of a stand-
ardized application of the Commission's expertise can be employed,
further enhancing the benefits sought in the original Act, the protec-
tion of investors and the assurance of fair and orderly securities
markets.
278. See note 219 supra & accompanying text. See also Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
